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WHY CHINA’S 2010 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM
FAILS TO REFORM MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INTRODUCTION
Violence against doctors and healthcare staff in the People’s Republic of
China has turned doctors and nurses into masters of self-defense. Healthcare
facilities in China have become “battlegrounds of discontent.”1 Scenes coming
out of hospitals in the People’s Republic of China look more like warzones
than healthcare institutions. In Guandong Province, nurses wear steel military
helmets while caring for newborns,2 and hired professionals teach self-defense
classes for female doctors and nurses.3 Doctors and hospital staff in Nanchang
were even issued long sticks and cans of mace to fight off a mob of people
carrying pitchforks and clubs.4
Unfortunately, violence against doctors and healthcare employees has
become commonplace in modern China. With no viable legal recourse for
medical malpractice, family members “take matters into their own hands.”5
Some families of malpractice victims attack hospitals for revenge, while others
choose to stage protests or riots in hopes that the local government will “pay to
quiet the protesters . . . .”6 Between January 1991 and July 2001, there were
568 attacks on healthcare facilities and workers in Hubei Province alone,
including some deaths.7 From 2000 to 2003, a total of ninety health care
workers were either wounded or disabled in Beijing’s 502 reported incidences
of violence against healthcare workers in the city.8 In Jiangsu Province,
violence increased by thirty-five percent each year from 2000 to 2002, with an
average of 177 attacks on healthcare facilities and workers per year.9 In 2006,
1

Sharon LaFraniere, Chinese Hospitals are Battlegrounds of Discontent, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2010, at

A1.
2 Doctors, Nurses Wearing Helmets, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 26, 2006, 10:54 AM), http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/photo/2006-12/26/content_767787.htm.
3 Doctors in Self-Defense Mode, CHINA DAILY (April 25, 2011, 7:59 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.
cn/opinion/2011-04/25/content_12384968.htm.
4 Barbara Demick, In China, Sixth Stage of Grief Calls for a Club, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2011, at A3.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Dean M. Harris & Chien-Chang Wu, Medical Malpractice in the People’s Republic of China: The
2002 Regulation of the Handling of Medical Accidents, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 456, 456 (2005).
8 Id.
9 Id.
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the Chinese Health Ministry reported that attacks by patients or their relatives
had injured more than 5,500 medical workers.10 In 2007, after reports that an
infant was denied life-saving treatment because his guardians could not afford
the £50 fee, 2,000 demonstrators attacked a city hospital, leading to ten injuries
and five arrests.11
The attacks on hospitals and healthcare workers are symptomatic of a
widespread discontent with the Chinese healthcare system and the government
that regulates it. The majority of the Chinese population does not have access
to sufficient medical care, and those who do often receive substandard care.12
Healthcare professionals’ negligence and failure to act puts patients at risk of
death or disability.13 For example, in the 1990s, up to one million people were
infected with HIV through transfusions of blood the public hospitals were
selling for profit.14 The media frequently reports on the most recent medical
accident15—with reports ranging from a “stillborn” infant found alive after
doctors wrapped her in a plastic bag and dumped her in a hospital bathroom16
to a worker who woke up from what was supposed to be a thumb-reattachment
surgery to find doctors had cut off his toe and sewed it onto his thumb.17
Patient attacks on doctors are common in China due to the lack of an
alternative way for injured parties to seek justice. There is no effective remedy
for injured patients because China lacks a “credible system to deal with
medical accidents and related problems in quality care.”18 People who fall
victim to medical malpractice find that it is “difficult to sue” even in the most
egregious cases.”19 The difficulty of suing for malpractice, coupled with the

10

LaFraniere, supra note 1, at A1.
Jonathan Watts, Chinese Hospital Staff Face Attack Amid High Prices and Dubious Care, THE
GUARDIAN (May 11, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/12/china.jonathanwatts1.
12 WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000: HEALTH SYSTEMS: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE
36 (2000).
13 Melinda Cooper, Experimental Republic: Medical Accidents (Productive and Unproductive) in
Postsocialist China, 5 E. ASIAN SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y: INT’L J. 313 (2011).
14 Demick, supra note 4.
15 In China, a “medical accident” refers to any incident of medical malpractice. It does not imply that the
incident was a pure accident or that no one was at fault. See generally Cooper, supra note 13.
16 Lucy Buckland, Doctors Dumped Baby in Plastic Bag After Telling Mother It Was a Dead Girl (Only
for Her to Find It Was a Little Boy Who Was ALIVE), MAIL ONLINE (Nov. 5, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://www.
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2057914.
17 China Worker Shocked to Find Thumb Replaced by Toe, ASIAONE (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.
asiaone.com/Health/News/Story/A1Story20111017-305544.html.
18 Harris & Wu, supra note 7, at 470.
19 Demick, supra note 4.
11
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historical mistrust of litigation among Chinese citizens,20 makes the possibility
of recourse though the law an unlikely alternative to physical violence.
China’s new Tort Liability Law21 came into force on July 1, 2010, and
includes a complete overhaul of the medical malpractice system.22 The new
law was highly praised as protecting “the rights of patients who suffer from
damage caused by medical malpractices, but also protect[ing] the lawful rights
of medical institutions and medical staff to ensure the healthy and ordered
development of the health-care system.”23 The law was touted as the ultimate
solution to the problem of hospital violence and medical malpractice.24
In theory, tort law is a logical solution to address hospital violence.25
Ideally, a medical malpractice system could compensate victims, deter tortious
behavior, and prevent retributive violence by providing an alternate forum for
justice after an incident of malpractice. However, tort theory relies on
assumptions that do not apply in the context of the legal system of China.26
The effectiveness of a tort system in minimizing tortious acts and pacifying
violence in response to tortious acts relies on the public’s ability to get a “fair”
trial and the public’s perception of that ability.27 Tort theory breaks down when
the general population does not anticipate justice from the court or does not
have access to courts.28 Without a legal structure that can fairly and efficiently
manage claims and to which all people have access, the Tort Liability Law will
be ineffective in controlling the issues the reform was intended to address.
This Comment uses tort theory to show that the new Tort Liability Law’s
medical malpractice provisions will be ineffective. The Tort Liability Law
does not adequately compensate victims, and it will fail to prevent tortious
20 MARGARET Y.K. WOO & MARY E. GALLAGHER, Introduction to CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 1 (Margaret Y.K. Woo & Mary E. Gallagher eds., 2011).
21
[Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) [hereinafter Tort Liability
Law], translated at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=182630.
22 Id. at ch. VII.
23 Yan-Lin Cao et al., Letter to the Editor, New Legislation in China Balancing the Rights of Both
Doctors and Patients, 52 MED. SCI. & L. 60, 61 (2012).
24 See, e.g., id. at 61–62 (“Although the judicial system in China differs from those in England, the USA
and other countries that adopt the Common Law, the principles of Medical Tort Law legislation established in
China can also be used as references for the judges in those countries while judging lawsuits of medical
malpractice.”).
25 See infra Part I.
26 See infra Part II.
27 See infra Part II.
28 See infra Part II.

中华人民共和国侵权责任法
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conduct and retributive hospital violence. Part I provides a background on tort
theory, and Part II situates the new Tort Liability Law within the context of the
Chinese legal system and healthcare system. Part III describes the most
important features of the new Tort Liability Law and analyzes the changes it
brings to the existing medical malpractice system. Part IV uses tort theory to
analyze the new law and identifies the flaws in the legislation that will prevent
it from bringing the desired improvements to the Chinese healthcare system.
Although, generally, China’s current trend of developing the legal system
reflects some progress, the medical malpractice portion of the Tort Liability
Law is a reform on the books that will not translate into actual medical reform.
As it is written, the unfortunate effect of the reform likely will be to further
suppress an already insufficient and underfunded medical industry. The law
will have to be accompanied by broader reform in the Chinese justice system
to achieve its purported goals. Real changes in the medical malpractice system
will not come until the government makes an investment in the administrative
processes to support the law and to assure its fair administration.
I. THE FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW
China’s new Tort Liability Law was formulated “[i]n order to protect the
legitimate rights and interests of parties in civil law relationships, clarify the
tort liability, prevent and punish tortious conduct, and promote the social
harmony and stability . . . .”29 This Comment will analyze the content of the
Tort Liability Law using tort theory to determine if the law will be able to
achieve its stated objectives. Traditional tort theory is an appropriate construct
within which to analyze China’s tort law because the goals of tort law that it
recognizes are in line with the stated goals of the Tort Liability Law.
Modern scholars recognize the two primary functions of tort law to be
compensation and deterrence.30 However, in the context of China, a third
function is also applicable: the prevention of retributive violence. This Part
will introduce these functions of tort law. Understanding tort law’s purposes is
necessary to be able to analyze the effectiveness of the medical malpractice
component of the Tort Liability Law.

29

Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. I, art. 1.
See Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and
Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 910 n.8 (2008).
30
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A. Compensation—To “protect the legitimate rights and interests of parties in
civil law relationships”31
The first major function of tort law is to compensate the person who is
injured by tortious wrongdoing.32 Compensation is fair because it serves to
“reimburse a victim for her losses from the tortious act, and . . . restore her to
her condition before the act.”33 Thus, tort law serves to “protect the legitimate
rights and interests of parties in civil law relationships”34 by restoring them to
the condition they were in before the tort.
To restore a victim to her pre-tort condition, she must be compensated for
all the injuries she suffered or will suffer because of the tort.35 For example, a
doctor who commits malpractice and injures a patient will have to compensate
her not only for her additional medical bills, but also for the wages she lost as a
result of the injury, and for the pain and suffering she experienced because of
the injury.36 For the Tort Liability Law to achieve its goal of protecting the
rights and interests of medical patients, it must provide for victims to be fully
compensated.
Compensation can be too low for many reasons. Court rulings could
systematically under compensate plaintiffs for the damages they suffer.
Alternatively, compensation could be too low if there is no forum to sue or if
people cannot afford to sue. When there is no forum to sue or people lack
access to justice, people who are injured will not be compensated at all. In
judging the effectiveness of a new law at achieving compensation, it is
necessary to consider the people who receive a settlement that may be too low
as well as the people who are prohibited from receiving their deserved
settlement at all. Either situation leads to under-compensation of victims.
B. Deterrence—To “prevent . . . tortious conduct”37
The second major function of tort law is to deter people from engaging in
inappropriately dangerous activities.38 Tort law deters harmful behavior by

31

Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. I, art. 1.
See generally 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 13 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing the function
of compensation in tort law).
33 Shepherd, supra note 30, at 910.
34 Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. I, art. 1.
35 Shepherd, supra note 30, at 910.
36 See id.
37 Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. I, art. 1.
32
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consistently forcing people to compensate the victims of that behavior.39 Tort
law seeks to force people to internalize the externalities of their own behavior,
which is to say that tort law forces an actor to compensate those who suffer the
consequences of the actor’s behavior.40 An externality is “a consequence or
side effect of one’s . . . activity, causing another to benefit without paying or to
suffer without compensation.”41 A person who anticipates she will be held
liable for the externalities her actions impose on others will “tend to avoid
conduct that could lead to [that] tort liability.”42
The Tort Liability Law seeks to prevent tortious conduct,43 so the new law
relies on a tort system’s deterrent effect. In the medical setting, tort law
theoretically means that a doctor knows she will end up paying for the
consequences when her unreasonable behavior puts her patients at risk.44 For
example, when a doctor is negligent and causes harm to a patient, she has to go
to court and pay the victim of her negligence to compensate the victim for the
harm.45 Knowing that she will ultimately be responsible for paying for any
damages, a rational doctor will take into account the costs of her actions on
other people.46 By forcing her to internalize the externalities of her actions, tort
law helps facilitate a situation in which people only take actions that have a net
social benefit.
1. The Assumption of Full Compensation
The deterrent effect of tort law relies on the assumption that people who act
negligently will actually have to pay full compensation to the victims.47 The
higher the damages an actor expects to pay, the more she will be deterred from
causing an accident.48 For the actor to be sufficiently deterred, compensation
38

Shepherd, supra note 30, at 910; see also, PETER CANE, ATIYAH’S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND
LAW 361–62 (William Twinning & Christopher McCrudden eds., 6th ed. 1999) (“[O]ne of the most
important of the suggested functions of personal injuries compensation law is deterrence.”).
39 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 32, § 14.
40 See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT
MATTERS 190 (2000).
41 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 664 (9th ed. 2009).
42 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 32, § 14.
43 Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. I, art. 1.
44 See Shepherd, supra note 30, at 912.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 “[B]ecause [a person] expects to pay for the harm he imposes on others, he will consider the cost of
that harm.” Id. at 912. If people know they will not actually have to pay for the damage their negligence
causes, they will not be deterred from being negligent.
48 See id. at 912–13.

THE
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has to be sufficiently high.49 Full compensation imposes perfect deterrence,
which is the socially optimal level of deterrence from unreasonable behavior.50
Perfect deterrence means that a person will consider the full extent of the
impact of her actions on other people.51
Conversely, when compensation is too low—as it is for medical
malpractice cases in China52—there is not perfect deterrence. In this case,
people are under-deterred from taking unreasonable actions. They take actions
that have too high of a cost to society. The result is an inefficiently large
number of torts or, in this case, instances of medical malpractice.
Under-compensation leads to under-deterrence. When courts hand out
settlements that are too low, actors will not be sufficiently motivated to
consider the entire cost of their actions.53 When there is no forum to sue or
people lack access to justice, parties know that they will not be held liable for
unreasonable actions and do not have to consider the externalities of their
actions.54 All of these situations mean that compensation is consistently too
low, and the assumption that tort law will deter inappropriately dangerous
behavior is unfounded. Thus, when compensation is systematically too low,
people will not be adequately deterred from causing the accident.
2. The Two Mechanisms of Deterrence: Effects on Level of Precaution and
Level of Activity
A person who anticipates she will face tort liability for any accident she
causes will try to engage in safer activities. Two factors affect the probability
that an accident will occur: level of precaution and activity level.55 To avoid
the accident, the actor must either increase the level of precaution or decrease
the activity level.
First, an increase in precaution is the most obvious way to lower the
number of accidents because an accident becomes less likely if people are

49

Id.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 206.
51 Id.
52 See Harris & Wu, supra note 7, at 470.
53 See 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 32, § 14.
54 See Shepherd, supra note 30, at 912–13.
55 Shepherd, supra note 30, at 911; see also Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1980); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic
Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 117 (1983).
50
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more careful.56 Ideally, tort law will impose liability on the individual who can
take precautions that are socially beneficial. For example, tort law imposes
liability for a car accident on the driver of the car, not on the passenger,
because the driver can drive more carefully, but the passenger has no control
over the safety of the car.57
The second way to affect the probability of an accident is by changing the
activity level.58 Naturally, an accident becomes less likely as an individual
decreases participation in the activity that causes the accident. For example,
one way to decrease the possibility of being in a car accident is to stop riding
in cars.59 This is a simple solution when the activity in and of itself is socially
undesirable. In such cases, laws should simply deter people from doing
socially undesirable activities altogether. For example, laws can forbid people
from committing murder or other socially useless crimes. However, sometimes
accidents are the by-product of socially desirable activities,60 as is the case
with medical malpractice.61 Lawmakers do not want to discourage people from
practicing medicine because society needs doctors.
Therefore, lawmakers must take care not to impose liabilities on parties
who can reduce the number of accidents by decreasing the activity level of an
otherwise desirable activity. Instead, laws should put the liability on someone
who can increase precaution. Theoretically, when the liability is on the party
that can increase precaution, the law can cause the same reduction in accidents
without reducing the benefits from the activity.62 Thus, when liability is
imposed on the individual with the power to increase precaution, society does
not have to sacrifice the benefits of a socially desirable activity to insure
against the costs it imposes in the form of occasional accidents.
C. Prevention of Self-Help—To “promote the social harmony and stability”63
The other major function of victim compensation is to avoid the breaches
of the peace that can occur when a victim takes justice into her own hands.

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Shepherd, supra note 30, at 911.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 912.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 55, at 121.
Shepherd, supra note 30, at 912.
See id. at 911.
Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. I, art. 1.
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Preservation of the peace was the earliest goal of tort law.64 In the United
States, tort law’s function of preserving the peace has been “obviated by
criminal law.”65 However, tort law’s role in preserving the peace is still
applicable in the context of medical malpractice in China. Criminal law has not
been successful in preventing retributive hospital violence, despite the fact that
prohibitions do exist and people are arrested for violating them.66 Additionally,
the Tort Liability Law specifically identifies that one of its goals is to “promote
the social harmony and stability.”67
Tort law promotes social harmony by seeking to avoid the possibility of
violence, which can escalate and lead to even greater societal damage.68
Ideally, when the public knows there is an appropriate remedy within the court
system, people will not seek violent retribution but will instead litigate the
issue in the courts.69 In the context of medical malpractice in China, this goal is
particularly attractive. When victims can seek compensation in the courts,
hospital violence should decrease.
At first glance, tort laws are perfectly suited to decrease hospital violence
in China. Compensating victims would be fair and would restore them to their
pre-tort condition. Deterring negligent behavior would decrease the number of
medical accidents in China and lead to fewer patient injuries. Compensation of
victims of negligence would provide an alternative form of justice and prevent
hospital violence. This Comment will analyze the actual laws China
implemented to determine if the Tort Liability Law will provide these
benefits.70 Despite the fact that tort liability has the potential to achieve these
goals, this Comment will show that the Tort Liability Law will not be able to
achieve them because it fails to establish the judicial infrastructure necessary to
translate the ideals listed on the page of the law into reality.71

64 Joseph H. King, The Torts Restatement’s Inchoate Definitions of Intent for Battery, and Reflections on
the Province of Restatements, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 623, 649 (2011).
65 Id.
66 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
67 Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. I, art. 1.
68 King, supra note 64, at 649.
69 Id.
70 See infra Part III.
71 See infra Part IV.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW
China has been in a period of increasing privatization since it entered the
international stage in the 1970s.72 Because of this general trend of
privatization, it is difficult to find an industry in China that is not
fundamentally different than it was in 1970.73 Accordingly, the medical
malpractice system is developing at the same time as the court and hospital
systems.74 To understand the potential for the new law to be effective in China,
it is necessary to first understand the state of the healthcare and court systems.
This Section will describe the modern history of the healthcare and judicial
systems to put the medical malpractice portion of the new Tort Liability Law
into context. Armed with the necessary analytical tools from Part I and
background information from Part II, the Comment will explain why the new
law will not fit into Chinese society.
A. The Chinese Healthcare System
Although the Chinese Constitution provides a right to healthcare,75 a
significant portion of the Chinese population remains without adequate care.76
The central government traditionally ran hospitals in China, but beginning in
1978 the central government greatly reduced funding for healthcare and shifted
the responsibility to provincial and local authorities.77 During the 1990s,
“unaffordable access to care became a major area of public discontent.”78
Hospitals were underfunded, and doctors were not paid well.79
Another problem in the Chinese healthcare system during the 1990s and
early 2000s was the decline in the level of health insurance.80 There was no
72 Fu Hualing, Access to Justice in China: Potentials, Limits, and Alternatives, in LEGAL REFORMS IN
CHINA AND VIETNAM: A COMPARISON OF ASIAN COMMUNIST REGIMES 163, 165 (John Gillespie & Albert
H.Y. Chen eds., 2010).
73 See The Long and Winding Road to Privatization in China, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 10, 2006),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1472.
74 See generally Tort Liability Law, supra note 21.
75 XIANFA art. 45 (2004) (China), translated at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/200711/15/content_1372964.htm (“Citizens of the People’s Republic of China have the right to material assistance
from the State and society when they are old, ill or disabled. The State develops the social insurance, social
relief and medical and health services that are required for citizens to enjoy this right.”).
76 WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 12, at 36.
77 Cooper, supra note 13, at 316.
78 Qi Cao et al., Report from China: Health Insurance in China—Evolution, Current Status, and
Challenges, 42 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVICES 177, 182 (2012).
79 Id.
80 Cooper, supra note 13, at 317.
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help for the uninsured.81 The result was that most medical services in China
were paid for out-of-pocket, and most of China’s poor could not afford
adequate care.82 In 2000, the World Health Organization ranked China 188 out
of the 191 member states for fairness of financial contributions to the
healthcare systems,83 noting that “great inequality characterizes a few countries
in which nearly all health spending is out-of-pocket, notably China . . . .”84 The
disparity is particularly pronounced in rural areas, where “[n]early 90 percent
of farm households now pay out of pocket for almost all their health
services.”85
China instituted a major health reform in 2009 that ignited notable progress
toward increasing insurance availability, but “it is still too early to judge
whether the political willingness to appease social unrest can be translated into
concrete health care protection for the population.”86 The Ministry of Health
reported near universal coverage by 2010.87 However, “coverage . . . does not
necessarily mean enjoying health care benefits,” and “[e]mpirical
evidence . . . has consistently shown less optimistic results.”88 Expanded
coverage increases the demand for services, and the Chinese health system
likely will take time to respond to increased demand. Thus, despite
improvements, it is safe to say that China still faces difficulties in ensuring its
population has access to adequate health services.
The government retains significant control of hospital operation.89 For
example, local government agencies control physician hiring and firing.90
Additionally, regulations set prices doctors can charge, and only
pharmaceuticals and technology (such as x-rays, etc.) are above market
value.91 Therefore, doctors have the incentive to overprescribe and overcharge
for pharmaceuticals and perform too many tests.92 Hospitals are not in a

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

See Harris & Wu, supra note 7, at 458.
WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 12, at 191.
Id.
Id. at 36.
WORLD BANK, CHINA 2020: FINANCING HEALTH CARE: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CHINA 56 (1997).
Cao et al., supra note 78, at 183–84.
Id. at 184.
Id.
See Harris & Wu, supra note 7, at 466.
Id.
Id. at 458–59.
Id.
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position to prevent this physician behavior because they do not have the power
to fire doctors.93
Finally, the end of the welfare state means that the consequences of
disability due to lack of healthcare or medical malpractice are becoming
increasingly severe. Today, disability welfare is very low. With the exception
of people who become disabled due to a work-related injury and receive fairly
high welfare benefits,94 permanent disability welfare benefits are equal to forty
percent of the insured’s wage.95 For the average person in China, this is not a
livable wage.96 Even in the case of egregious medical malpractice, without tort
law the victim faces the possibility of no compensation, a permanent loss of
her ability to earn income, and a significant decrease in her available funds.97
B. The Changing Structure of Chinese Courts
The concept of civil litigation is new to China, and it is uncomfortable to
many in the Chinese culture. Communist China punished what would be
today’s torts with criminal sentences and resolved disputes between individuals
with mediation.98 The mediated agreements were “legally binding in the same
way as a court judgment.”99 However, the goal of mediation in China was for
individuals to voluntarily reach a mutually acceptable agreement.100 In
practice, though, mediation was generally not as voluntary as it was purported
to be.101 In the event that mediation failed, the mediation judge became the

93 Id. at 466 (“[T]he managers of hospitals in China currently do not have the authority to fire staff
physicians who provide poor quality of care, because hiring and firing of staff is controlled by government
authorities.”).
94 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD: ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,
2010, at 63 (2011), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2010-2011/asia/ssptw10asia.
pdf.
95 Id. at 61.
96 In 2003, the average annual dispensable income was 8,472 renminbi (“RMB”) (about U.S. $1,050 in
2003), and the average annual net income in rural areas was about 2,622 RMB (about U.S. $320). Harris &
Wu, supra note 7, at 464.
97 Id.
98 Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of Civil Justice
Reform in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 25, 29
(Margaret Y.K. Woo & Mary E. Gallagher ed., 2011).
99 Michael J. Moser, People’s Republic of China, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ASIA 73, 82 (Michael
Pryles ed., 1997).
100 Id.
101 Hualing & Cullen, supra note 98, at 33.
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adjudication judge, so judges had the incentive to push parties to settle.102 The
weaker party, usually the plaintiff, often gave in to the pressure to settle.103
Additionally, mediation was more time-consuming than adjudication,
making it inefficient and too costly to meet the increasing demand for dispute
resolution.104 As more and more of China’s economy became privatized, the
need for dispute resolution also increased.105 The number of civil cases surged
because of China’s increasing privatization, industrialization, and the need to
meet foreign businesses’ demands for China to provide a forum for civil
litigation.106 In 1990, Chinese courts heard a total of 2.9 million cases, and by
2007, courts heard 4,383,080 civil cases alone.107 Overworked city courts
began to abandon mediation for adjudication.108 However, mediation had left
its mark on the Chinese conscience, as potential plaintiffs knew they would not
have a fair shot at getting the compensation they deserved.109
Today, Chinese courts enjoy much less power than courts in the United
States for three reasons, each of which has important implications for medical
malpractice. First, individual judges are not independent, and China’s highest
court, the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”), issues instructions to all of the
lower courts for how to handle different types of cases.110 Accordingly, cases
are non-precedential, and usually the courts do not give much explanation for
their decisions.111
Because judges are not independent and because cases are not precedential,
it is often difficult to anticipate how a court will rule in a particular civil claim
before the SPC has issued its judicial interpretations,112 especially in
undeveloped fields such as medical malpractice. Even when the judicial
interpretations have been issued, they are usually unpublished or difficult to

102

Id.
Id.
104 Id., at 35.
105 DANIEL C.K. CHOW, Courts and Procuratorates, in THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 195, 205 (2d ed. 2009).
106 Hualing & Cullen, supra note 98, at 33.
107 CHOW, supra note 105, at 205.
108 Hualing & Cullen, supra note 98, at 33.
109 Id.
110 CHOW, supra note 105, at 211–12.
111 Id. at 214–15.
112 See id.
103
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find.113 Legal research is difficult in China because of “the scarcity of legal
information, the high difficulty of information access, the quality of legal
publishing (which is below standard), the lack of a uniform system of subject
classification, underdeveloped library facilities and services, and the shortage
of information specialists.”114 Impoverished plaintiffs usually do not have the
means to risk losing their money to a trial and are unlikely to sue if they cannot
predict a victory.115 Therefore, the lack of accessible legal information and the
unpredictability of court decisions make it less likely that the injured poor will
file a lawsuit.
Second, the Communist Party of China (the “CCP”) is against protracted
litigation and views it as a sign that SPC is failing.116 The CCP views the
increase of civil cases as a result of judicial ineffectiveness and failure to
immediately squash (or prevent) disputes.117 The CCP expects judges to both
mediate and persuade parties into a compromise.118 Although it is impossible
to determine how much of a role the CCP plays in individual cases, it is
suspected that the CCP influences high-stakes cases.119 If the CCP does
influence cases, it makes it less likely that plaintiffs in malpractice litigation
will get a fair hearing without getting quickly thrown out of court.120 This is
especially true when the defendant is a prominent hospital, an asset that the
CCP likely would seek to protect.
Finally, and most importantly, Chinese courts are vulnerable to the
influence of local governments. Unlike federal courts in the United States,
which constitute one of three co-equal branches of government, Chinese courts
are responsible to the people’s congresses at each of the central, provincial,
and local levels.121 There is no tenure for judges, and judges rely on people’s

113 See Joan Liu, Finding Chinese Law on the Internet, NYU-HAUSER GLOBAL LAW SCHOOL PROGRAM—
GLOBALEX (Feb. 2005), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/China.htm.
114 Id.
115 See Matthew Rabin, Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem, 68
ECONOMETRICA, 1281, 1281 (2000) (“We dislike vast uncertainty in lifetime wealth because a dollar that helps
us avoid poverty is more valuable than a dollar that helps us become very rich.”).
116 See Hualing & Cullen, supra note 98, at 47–48.
117 See id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 33 (discussing the political pressure on judges and, in turn, on parties).
120 See Mahmud Yesuf & Randall A. Bluffstone, Poverty, Risk Aversion, and Path Dependence in LowIncome Countries: Experimental Evidence from Ethiopia, 91 AMER. J. AGR. ECON., 1022, 1023 (2009) (“We
find very high levels of risk aversion . . . and strong evidence that household circumstances have important
impacts on risk-averting behavior, with potentially significant implications for long-term poverty.”).
121 CHOW, supra note 105, at 199.
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congresses for funding, staffing, and appointments.122 The fact that courts are
subordinate to their legislative counterparts significantly disadvantages
plaintiffs because the legislature in China consistently favors economic growth
over individual rights or compensation.123 In addition, court decisions feature
pervasive local protectionism.124 Local governments put pressure on courts to
protect local economic interests.125 Local governments refuse to enforce
judgments within their jurisdiction from outside their jurisdiction, with up to
thirty-five percent non-enforcement.126 As a result, when state-owned
enterprises or businesses that are very important to the local economy are
involved in lawsuits, the courts will favor the economically important
“defendant at the expense of the law.”127 Additionally, bribes are common,
which leads to even greater influence for economically important
enterprises.128 Finally, there is typically no recourse against the local
government.129 Local governments refuse to comply with court orders because
they have authority over the court.130
Even if a victim of malpractice could secure a fair trial, he likely would
have difficulty finding a lawyer to manage his case. There are not enough
lawyers in China to cover the demand for legal aid, especially in rural areas.131
China is attempting to address this issue through laws that make pro bono work
mandatory and by authorizing “barefoot” lawyers, or legal workers who did
not attend law school, to do some transactions.132 Additionally, the government
sponsors legal aid for the poorest of the poor, but these services are only
available to people with incomes far below the poverty line, and “[m]ost quite
genuinely impoverished people in China do not qualify.”133 Thus, the majority
of the population would not be able to secure a lawyer to go to court.134

122

Id. at 199–200.
Id. at 224.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 226.
127 Id. at 224. Hospitals, which were traditionally state-run and are an important part of a community’s
infrastructure, likely would fall into this privileged category.
128 Id. at 225.
129 Id. at 226.
130 Id. (“The author has been told by some government organs that they are of equal or greater
bureaucratic rank to courts and see no reason to obey court orders.”).
131 Hualing, supra note 72, at 173.
132 Id. at 170–71.
133 Id. at 172–73.
134 See id.
123
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In sum, litigation is fairly new to Chinese society, and for cultural and
historical reasons, the public has responded to it with a generalized mistrust.135
The old system of mediation disfavored plaintiffs by pushing them to settle, so
the entry of adjudication into Chinese society was met by the assumption of a
unfairness.136 Years of preferential treatment for economically important
industries and for the local government added to this public distrust of the
court system.137 Even when people have faced serious harm at the hands of
someone else, they are unlikely to be able to afford the necessary fees to take
the case to court for the possibility of compensation.138 As it is, the Chinese
court system does not provide a fair and balanced forum for the litigation of
civil disputes. As this Comment will show later, any medical malpractice
system that does not address these greater social and structural issues with the
court system would face serious challenges during implementation and could
likely only be marginally effective.139
C. The History of Medical Malpractice in China
Medical malpractice litigation is new to China, having developed in
response to China’s privatization in the 1970s.140 The medical malpractice
portion of the Tort Liability Law141 is the third set of regulations to
comprehensively reform the medical malpractice system, with previous
reforms in 1987 and 2002.142 This Section highlights how the successes and
failures of the 1987 and 2002 regulations molded and motivated the Tort
Liability Law in 2010.

135

See supra text accompanying notes 98–109.
See supra text accompanying notes 98–109.
137 See supra text accompanying notes 124–29.
138 See infra text accompanying notes 175–78.
139 See infra Part IV.
140 See infra Part II.C.1.
141 Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. VII.
142 [Regulations on the Handling of Medical Accidents] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Feb. 20, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2002) (China) [hereinafter 2002 Regulation], translated at
http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-07/25/content_16885.htm; [Regulation on Dealing with Medical Incidents]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 1987 (China) [hereinafter 1987
Regulation].
136
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1. The “Administrative” Doctor–Patient Relationship and the 1987
Regulation on Dealing with Medical Incidents
At the time of the Cultural Revolution,143 all medical facilities in China
were part of the public welfare system and were owned and operated by the
central government.144 As a result, the relationship between hospitals and
patients was administrative or quasi-administrative.145 At this time, local
administrative agencies were expected to sufficiently regulate their
administrators (i.e. doctors) and manage malpractice disputes.146 The result
was haphazard regulation that varied greatly across China and was
unsuccessful in controlling medical negligence.147 The government attempted
to stabilize and establish uniformity to healthcare regulation148 in 1987 with the
Regulation on Dealing with Medical Incidents (“1987 Regulation”).149
The 1987 Regulation made doctors and hospitals formally liable for
instances of medical negligence.150 It set up a system through which patients
injured by medical malpractice could get a limited, one-time reimbursement
for the cost of the additional healthcare required by the injury and other
economic expenses.151 Under the 1987 Regulation it was assumed that injured
patients would not need living expenses because they would “receive
economic support and care from their government, local collective enterprise,
or business employer.”152 The 1987 Regulation is “historically notable for
initiating a shift in the political understanding and management of risk, from an
administrative notion of collective accident insurance to a legal framework of
private contractual relationships between doctor and patient.”153 Nonetheless,
as written, the regulation was vague in its definitions of what constituted
143 The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a period of social upheaval in China from 1966–1976
under Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in which Mao attempted to combat the
capitalist developments in China and return to the values of communism and revolution. See generally
JONATHAN SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 602–26 (1990). The Cultural Revolution resulted in
mass social upheaval and markedly corroded the CCP’s legitimacy. Id. at 624–25. This corrosion was the
precursor to China’s turn toward capitalism and more openness to the outside world in the 1980s. Id. at 623–
24.
144 Harris & Wu, supra note 7, at 458.
145 Id. at 460.
146 Id. at 459–60.
147 Id. at 460.
148 Id.
149 1987 Regulation, supra note 142.
150 Cooper, supra note 13, at 319.
151 Harris & Wu, supra note 7, at 461.
152 Id.
153 Cooper, supra note 13, at 319.
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malpractice and was easily manipulated to protect government interests in
hospitals.154 Also, under the 1987 Regulation, the available financial remedies
did not fully compensate victims for their injuries.155
Increasing healthcare costs made it more difficult for the government to
continue funding healthcare. The economic reform and the reduction of the
welfare state in China brought less government funding for hospitals.156 Today,
most funding for healthcare comes from out-of-pocket fees for services and
very little comes from the central government or from private health
insurance.157 Nonetheless, the majority of Chinese hospitals are owned by
some level of government.158 As the central government pulled out of the
healthcare system, the administrative relationship between doctors and patients
was no longer appropriate, and there was an increasing need for medical
malpractice cases to be heard under civil law.159 The 1987 Regulation’s limited
compensation scheme had previously been justified as a type of administrative
insurance policy for negligence of administrative agents (doctors), but it was
not relevant for litigation between two private parties.160 The limited
compensation scheme “became an unfair shield for hospitals and clinics,” both
of which would be required to pay lower compensation for injuries caused by
their negligence.161 China needed a new regulation to modernize medical
malpractice litigation.
2. The 2002 Regulation on the Handling of Medical Accidents and Its
Subsequent Interpretations
By the turn of the twenty-first century, the 1987 Regulation was
insufficient to control medical accidents. Frequent incidences of violence and
rioting at hospitals reflected public discontent with the quality of care at
medical institutions.162 In response to the public outcry, the State Council
adopted and implemented the 2002 Regulation on the Handling of Medical
Accidents (“2002 Regulation”).163 The 2002 Regulation cited four goals: to (1)
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Harris & Wu, supra note 7, at 461.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 458.
Id.
Id. at 461.
Cooper, supra note 13, at 319.
Harris & Wu, supra note 7, at 461.
Id. at 456.
2002 Regulation, supra note 142.
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correctly handle medical accidents; (2) protect the lawful rights and interests of
patients and medical institutions as well as their medical workers; (3) maintain
order in healthcare facilities, ensuring the safety of healthcare employees; and
(4) promote the development of medical science.164 The 2002 Regulation
replaces the 1987 Regulation and was celebrated for improving on the previous
version’s deficiencies.165 The 2002 Regulation increased the “amount of
compensation, clarified procedures for resolving medical disputes, and, for the
first time, introduced reforms for improving the overall quality of care.”166
However, the 2002 Regulation suffered from serious weaknesses. These
weaknesses included: (a) under-compensation for victims of negligence and of
negligent failure to act; (b) failure to adequately deter inappropriately
dangerous behavior by creating barriers to prevent injured parties from filing
suit; and (c) failure to control retributive violence in the hospital setting. Each
problem will be discussed in turn.
a. The 2002 Regulation Under Compensated Victims of Negligence.
One major shortcoming of the 2002 Regulation is that it did not provide
sufficient compensation for victims of negligence. The 2002 Regulation did
increase compensation for victims of medical malpractice, but the amount was
still unavailable to many people. For example, the 2002 Regulation provided
no compensation for people who were injured by physician inaction.167 The
2002 Regulation defined “medical accident” as “an accident caused by a
medical institution or its medical workers resulting in personal injuries to a
patient due to faults in medical activities as a result of violation of the laws,
administrative regulations or departmental rules on medical and health
administration, or of standards or procedures for diagnosis, cure and
nursing.”168 To impose liability on someone under the 2002 Regulation, the
person had to affirmatively cause the action, and there was no liability for
failure to act.169 The families of patients who died because of physician
inaction were not compensated for their losses.

164

Id. art. 1.
See Cooper, supra note 13, at 319..
166 Id.
167 See 2002 Regulation, supra note 142.
168 Id. art. 2 (emphasis added).
169 Id. But see Zhiye Yishi Fa (
) [Law on Medical Practitioners] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People's Cong., June 26, 1998, effective May 1, 1999), art. 24 (China), translated at
http://www.nmec.org.cn/English/08081201.htm (“Doctors should adopt emergency measures to examine and
165

执业医师法
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Additionally, the 2002 Regulation was “unfair to the worst-situated people
in society.”170 For example, the regulation allowed economic damage awards
to cover only twenty years of living expenses of the injured party’s disabled
dependents if the dependents were over the age of sixteen.171 This was
problematic because it was unfair to the victim who would not be fully
compensated for her lost ability to provide for her family.172
Perhaps the largest contributor to the under-compensation of victims under
the 2002 Regulation was the high cost of the required authentication process,
which served to bar many plaintiffs from ever filing a lawsuit. For a claim to
be heard, the regulation specified that the basis for the claim had to be
authenticated by a medical expert to prove that it was valid.173 The government
set the fees for authentication.174 In 2005, fees for authentication ranged from
1,500-3,000 renminbi (“RMB”) (about U.S. $180-$360) at the city level and
from 2,000-4,000 RMB (about U.S. $240-$480) at the province level.175 In a
population where the average annual dispensable income was 8,472 RMB
(about U.S. $1,050) and the average annual net income in rural areas was about
2,622 RMB (about U.S. $320),176 most people were precluded from seeking
compensation by the cost of mandatory authentication.
The SPC added another layer of complexity that made it more difficult for
plaintiffs to sue when it created a two-track medical liability system.177 This
system distinguished medical torts caused by medical malpractice from other
medical torts.178 Medical malpractice torts were governed by the 2002
Regulation, while other medical torts were governed by the General Provisions
of Civil Law.179 The damages available under the 2002 Regulation were
significantly lower than the damages available under the General Provisions of

treat patients who are suffering from acute diseases or dangerously ill and shall not refuse to give emergency
treatment.”).
170 Harris & Wu, supra note 7, at 467.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Harris & Wu, supra note 7, at 464.
174 Id. at 467.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Mo Zhang, Tort Liabilities and Torts Law: The New Frontier of Chinese Legal Horizon, 10 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 415, 490–91 (2011).
178 Liabilities for Medical Tort under PRC Tort Liability Law, MWE CHINA LAW OFFICES,
www.mwechinalaw.com/news/2010/chinalawalert0310b.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
179 Id.
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Civil Law.180 To further the confusion, medical malpractice torts had to seek
authentication from a semi-governmental organization called the National
Association of Medical Science, while other medical torts were authenticated
by a judicial agency.181 Because the lines between the two types of torts were
blurred,182 people who did not know which institution to go to risked paying
the fees to both. If a claim involved both types of tort, each agency had to
authenticate its respective aspects of the claim.183 This “dualization” for the
application of law created another barrier for plaintiffs seeking retribution for a
medical injury,184 making it even less likely that victims would ever actually
receive compensation.
Thus, under the 2002 Regulation, compensation was too low for several
reasons. High fees and systemic disorganization precluded most injured people
from filing a claim. People injured by physician inaction could not seek
compensation at all. Finally, plaintiffs who won lawsuits were systematically
under compensated. Combined, these problems led to gross undercompensation of victims.
b. The 2002 Regulation Failed to Adequately Deter Inappropriately
Dangerous Behavior Because It Created Barriers to Prevent Injured
Parties from Filing Suit.
By providing inadequate compensation for victims of negligence and no
compensation for victims of physician inaction, the 2002 Regulation led to
insufficient deterrence. Because the healthcare workers or healthcare facilities
would not have to pay for the total damages caused by their negligence,185 they
would not be sufficiently deterred from committing negligent acts.186
Additionally, physicians knew most tort liability would not be enforced
because victims could not afford to sue their injurers,187 so physicians did not
have the incentive to avoid risky activities that would lead to tort liability.188
The cumulative result of under-compensation and very low probability of tort

180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Zhang, supra note 177, at 491.
Id. at 491.
Cao et al., supra note 23, at 60.
Zhang, supra note 177, at 491.
Cao et al., supra note 23, at 60.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part II.B.
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liability enforcement created inefficiently low deterrence and too many
incidences of medical malpractice.
c. The 2002 Regulation Failed to Control Retributive Violence in the
Hospital Setting.
Finally, despite the fact that both the 1987 Regulation and the 2002
Regulation sought to lower retributive violence in hospitals, high levels of
violence remained.189 Unfortunately, the high rate of retributive violence
against hospital staff indicates that the established system under the 2002
Regulation has not yet accomplished this goal and the public does not view the
court system as an adequate forum for resolving disputes.
Ideally, the shortcomings of the 2002 Regulation would have been
addressed in the next regulation. Looking toward the 2010 Tort Liability Law,
there are several gaps that it should have filled. First, the next generation of
regulations should have increased the compensation for victims of medical
malpractice so that it fully compensated for the injury. It should have provided
compensation for people injured by physician inaction to encourage doctors to
actively intervene with the critically ill and elderly. Next, the new law should
have reduced the cost of authentication or provided some method by which
injured parties would not be precluded from filing suit because they could not
afford it. The law should have simplified the two-track medical liability system
to make it more manageable or, at the very least, clarified the boundaries
between medical malpractice torts and other medical torts. Finally, as
previously discussed, the new regulation should have addressed the widespread
problem of retributive violence in hospitals by providing a reliable, alternate
forum for disputes and by decreasing the number of medical accidents.
III. THE NEW LAW
On December 26, 2009, the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress promulgated the Tort Liability Law after more than seven years of
drafting.190 The Tort Liability Law, which came into force on July 1, 2010, is
the first single piece of legislation on torts since 1949, and it is “acclaimed in
China as a significant modern legislative achievement in civil rights
protection.”191 The passage of the law was widely celebrated as a breakthrough
189
190
191

See supra notes 1–20 and accompanying text.
Zhang, supra note 177, at 417.
Id. at 417–18.
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for the tort liability system. Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress, claimed the law was a significant
development in “protecting civil rights and people’s interests, preventing and
punishing infringement acts, reducing conflicts and promoting social harmony
and stability.”192
The Tort Liability Law is comprehensive. Its twelve chapters and ninetytwo articles set up the general regulations for tort liability as well as the
specific regulations for product liability, vehicle traffic accident liability,
medical malpractice liability, environmental pollution liability, highly
dangerous activity liability, animal breeding damage liability, and object
damage liability.193 The fact that the medical malpractice law came into effect
along with a comprehensive overhaul of the tort system is important because it
means that it is unclear where medical malpractice will fit into the new legal
structure.
Chapter VII of the Tort Liability Law sets up liability for medical
malpractice. Chapter VII composes eleven of the ninety-two articles in the Tort
Liability Law, which is more than any other chapter. Chinese analysts say that
its length relative to the other provisions indicates “the discretion and highly
conscientious attitude of legislators while legislating regulations on the
medical malpractice liability.”194 However, at just over 700 words, Chapter VII
is brief relative to the prolific medical malpractice legislation in other
countries.195 Chapter VII is also simple and brief relative to the 2002
Regulation, which laid out specific procedures by which institutions were to
handle medical accidents and experts were to assess those accidents.196 The
SPC has not clarified how the Tort Liability Law will interact with previous
regulations. On June 30, 2010, the SPC issued a decree that stated that tort
cases should apply relevant regulations, but did not specify what those
regulations are.197 Many procedural and substantive questions remain, and
significant judicial interpretation from the SPC will be necessary to define the
limits of the new medical malpractice standards.
192 Jiang Aitao, Top Legislature Adopts Tort Law, CRJENGLISH.COM (Dec. 26, 2009, 1:05 PM), http://
english.cri.cn/6909/2009/12/26/189s538175.htm.
193 Cao et al., supra note 23, at 60.
194 Id.
195 Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. VII.
196 2002 Regulation, supra note 142, ch. II–III.
197 [Notice on the People’s Republic of China Tort Liability Law], (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., effective July 1, 2010) SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. (July 1, 2010) 1, 1 (China), available at
http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/html/2010-07/01/content_11608.htm.
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Chapter VII separates medical malpractice law into three categories:
general medical malpractice, malpractice caused by defective medical
products, and malpractice caused by medical ethics violations.198 Additionally,
Chapter VII creates new laws to address directly the problem of retributive
violence on medical facilities.199 This Section will introduce each category of
medical malpractice under the new law and identify the liable party for each
type of incident.
A. General Medical Malpractice
General medical malpractice damage occurs when there is an injury during
the course of diagnosis or treatment. The new law imposes liability and a
presumption of fault on the medical institutions when there is any harm that
results from the violation of a law, administrative regulation, or the procedures
for correct diagnosis or treatment.200 Additionally, Chapter VII imposes
liability for harming patients as a result of failure to “fulfill the obligations of
diagnosis and treatment up to the standard.”201 The statute does not define this
“standard,” and it does not provide insight as to where to find clarification.
B. Malpractice Caused by Defective Medical Products
Following the widespread problems with contamination of the blood
supply,202 the new legislation imposes liability for defective medical products,
including drugs, medical disinfectant, medical instruments, or substandard
blood transfusions.203 The patient has the option of seeking compensation from
the medical institution or the manufacturer of the product.204 Hospitals that pay
out a lawsuit for defective medical products are “entitled to be reimbursed by
the liable manufacturer or institution providing blood.”205
C. Malpractice caused by Medical Ethics Violations
Chapter VII also includes a list of medical ethics violations. First, Article
58 creates a presumption of fault on the part of the medical institution for any
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

See Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. VII.
Id. art. 64.
Id. art. 58.
Id. art. 57.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. VII, art. 59.
Id.
Id.
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harm that comes from refusing to provide medical history data related to a
dispute or tampering with any medical history data.206 Medical institutions
assume tort liability for Article 58 violations.207
The other listed medical ethics violations do not impose liability on
anyone. Article 63 attempts to address the problem of the over-use of testing208
by forbidding “unnecessary examinations in violation of the procedures and
standards for diagnosis and treatment.”209 Article 61 requires medical
institutions to keep copies of hospital admission logs, test reports, nurse care
records, expense sheets, and other medical history data and to provide it to
patients who request their medical records.210 Neither Article 63 nor Article 61
mentions any potential liability for their violation.
D. Prohibition of Retributive Violence
Finally, Chapter VII directly addresses hospital violence and protects the
“legitimate rights and interests of a medical institution and its medical staff.”211
It provides that “[a]nyone who interrupts the order of the medical system or
obstructs the work or life of medical staff shall be subject to legal liability.”212
IV. ANALYSIS
The Tort Liability Law will not achieve its objectives to compensate
victims, deter negligence, and decrease hospital violence. To achieve its goals,
tort law requires a basic legal structure through which the people trust that
compensation will restore them to their pre-accident condition. China does not
have this structure. Additionally, the Tort Liability Law suffers from major
flaws that prevent it from being effective in regulating the tort system. This
Part analyzes the Tort Liability Law’s ability to achieve the full potential of a
tort system. Without substantial improvements to the overall justice system,
the law will be ineffective in compensating victims, deterring negligence, and
controlling retributory hospital violence.

206
207
208
209
210
211
212

Id. art. 58.
Id.
See Cao et al., supra note 23, at 61.
Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. VII, art. 63.
Id. art. 61.
Id. art. 64.
Id.
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A. Compensation—To “protect the legitimate rights and interests of parties in
civil law relationships”213
The first function of a tort system is to compensate victims of negligence.
The Tort Liability Law fails to ensure adequate compensation to victims of
medical malpractice. Overall, plaintiffs who successfully sue for malpractice
do not receive full compensation.214 Additionally, high authentication fees,
lack of attorneys, and generalized distrust with the court system mean that
many deserving plaintiffs will never see the inside of a courtroom and will not
receive any compensation whatsoever.215 Finally, the Tort Liability Law
recognizes medical ethics violations but provides for no practical possibility
for victims of these violations to receive compensation.216 As a whole, the Tort
Liability Law does not make any significant improvement to the amount of
compensation that victims of medical malpractice will receive.
1. Despite Improvements, Compensation Levels are Set Too Low
One improvement in the new law is that it includes a provision that allows
for compensation for harm caused by physician inaction. Article 57 states that
medical facilities will be liable when failure to fulfill the obligations of
diagnosis and treatment leads to harm.217 People injured by physician inaction
who were not previously compensated will now have the opportunity for
compensation.
However, the statute is silent about what a physician’s obligation will be in
the event that a person is harmed by physician inaction when the person cannot
pay for treatment. It is likely that physicians will continue to refuse treatment
to patients who cannot pay. Hospitals are overrun with patients they simply do
not have the capacity to treat,218 and hospitals need to treat the ones who pay in
order to stay open. Additionally, even in the event that this law does mean to
impose liability on doctors for refusing treatment to non-paying patients, the
possibility of being held liable for failing to treat a patient who cannot afford
treatment is very slim because the patient or her family is unlikely to be able to
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Id. ch. I, art. 1.
See Part IV.A.1.
See Part IV.A.2.
See Part IV.A.2.b.
Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. VII, art. 57.
See Part II.A.
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afford to pursue the lawsuit.219 Thus, any effect this law will have in providing
compensation to victims of medical malpractice likely will only be observed in
insured patients or patients who can afford to pay out of pocket.
People injured by physician inaction can now (at least in theory) seek
compensation along with victims of negligence, but will the compensation they
receive be high enough to restore them to their pre-tort condition? The Tort
Liability Law is also silent as to whether it affects the value of the
compensation the courts will hand out. However, there is no reason to believe
the new law will increase compensation to victims of medical malpractice. The
2002 Regulation highlighted the importance of increased compensation by
creating it made a specific provision to do so.220 The compensation chapter of
the 2002 Regulation by itself is longer than the entire medical malpractice
portion of the Tort Liability Law. Had increasing compensation been a goal of
this regulation, the Tort Liability Law would have made a point to mention it.
The Tort Liability Law is unlikely to bring about an increase in compensation
for medical malpractice victims. Therefore, victims who win lawsuits will
continue to be under compensated.
2. Under-Enforcement Means Most Victims Will Not Be Compensated
On its face, then, the Tort Liability Law earns a mixed review for getting
victims closer to full compensation. While the new law grants compensation to
victims of physician failure to act, it fails to improve their levels of
compensation. However, this mixed review assumes that the law will be
enforced as written, and this is not a fair assumption. Tort relies on the public’s
ability to “self-police” and seek due compensation. 221
Currently, the Chinese people will not self-police to enforce the Tort
Liability Law and therefore will not be compensated for their injuries. Many
victims in China will not sue either (a) because of the barriers to the lawsuit, or
(b) because the potential gain is so low that it is not worth it to sue. This
Subpart will analyze each possibility.

219 Expenses for filing a lawsuit include the authentication fee and attorney’s fee. See supra Part II.B. &
Part II.C.2.a. and accompanying text.
220 2002 Regulation, supra note 142, ch. V, art. 50.
221 See supra Part I.B.
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a. Barriers to Lawsuits Prohibit Plaintiffs from Filing Suit.
Although the Tort Liability Law aimed to more firmly establish victims’
rights, it did very little to address the significant and often insurmountable
hurdles victims must overcome to bring a lawsuit. This Subpart identifies the
hurdles that the Tort Liability Law removed and the other hurdles that remain.
The Tort Liability Law did not do enough to eliminate barriers that deter
plaintiffs from seeking the compensation they deserve. Because deserving
plaintiffs will be prevented from being compensated, the public cannot
effectively self-police and the Tort Liability Law will be under-enforced.
The most significant hurdle to bringing suit that the Tort Liability Law
eliminates is the “dualization” of the handling of medical accidents.222 The
SPC interpretation of the 2002 Regulation draws a distinction between medical
malpractice and other medical torts.223 The line between the two was blurry so
it was difficult to place an incident in one category or the other.224 However,
the procedures for each were very different, and incorrect placement meant a
plaintiff would not be compensated.225 The Tort Liability Law terminates this
distinction. Eliminating the dualization of medical accident torts will
streamline the process of filing a medical accident lawsuit, and it will avoid the
unnecessary expenses stemming from debating which set of rules applies.
Although eliminating the unnecessary distinction between medical torts
removes one hurdle to bringing a lawsuit, it in itself is not enough to ensure
effective enforcement of the Tort Liability Law.
The most direct barrier that the new law fails to eliminate is the
prohibitively high cost of authentication. The new law is silent as to whether
medical tort claims under the Tort Liability Law must continue to go through
the authentication process and whether the victims must continue to pay the
authentication fees. The law is not likely the procedure of filing a claim will
change in a fundamental way.
This Comment does not seek to argue that the existence of an
authentication fee is universally without value. In fact, an authentication fee
can be efficient when it serves to protect against opening the floodgates of
litigation. This role of the fees would prevent cases from coming to court that
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See supra text accompanying notes 178–85.
See supra text accompanying notes 178–85.
See supra text accompanying notes 178–85.
See supra text accompanying notes 178–85.
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would cost more to litigate than the victim would receive in compensation.
From society’s perspective, it is wasteful and unfavorable to spend more
money transferring assets than the value of the assets being transferred.
Therefore, in this capacity, the authentication fee can be a useful tool to
prevent the net social loss that would occur if court systems spent days
litigating valueless or meritless claims.
The authentication fee, however, does not serve this beneficial purpose.
Because the authentication fee is exorbitantly high as compared to the average
income in China,226 the fee serves as a bar to litigation for the majority of
China’s population. It therefore discriminates against all but the wealthiest
Chinese citizens. People with legitimate claims will not be heard because much
of the population does not have access to justice. In this context, the fee
prevents people from filing a lawsuit and getting their due compensation.
People cannot effectively self-police when they do not have the money
required to assert their rights. As a result, many people will not be adequately
compensated.
In addition to the authentication fee, the new law fails to address many of
the other barriers to lawsuits. Societally, the people of China are accustomed to
a system in which they do not expect to receive a fair trial.227 Because of the
cultural distrust of litigation,228 individuals are unlikely to try to sue if they are
injured. When they try to sue, they are unlikely to be able to afford the
authentication fees.229 They may not be able to find a lawyer at all, and if they
do find a lawyer, they probably cannot afford to pay her.230 If they find a way
to manage the fees, they are unlikely to receive a fair trial in a court system
that is systematically biased against plaintiffs because of local protectionism,
the potential influence of the CCP, and bribes.231 The Tort Liability Law does
nothing to address these issues. All these remaining hurdles serve to preclude
the majority of victims from ever seeing the money they deserve. Victims can
only receive compensation if they can successfully bring a claim against the
party that harmed them. The new law does not do enough to give victims the
opportunity to make that claim.
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See supra note 96.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.B.
See Harris & Wu, supra note 7, at 467
See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
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The Tort Liability Law is one isolated piece of legislation within a system
that lacks in the infrastructure to support it. China will need to make
fundamental changes before the Tort Liability Law will be able to “protect the
legitimate rights and interests of parties in civil law relationships” by providing
full compensation to people when their rights are violated.232 First, the current
method of charging the authentication fee needs to change. If authentication
and the associated fee are to retain their role in the court system, China should
tailor them so that they do not serve as a permanent bar to a group of people.
There must be some way to provide access to justice for those who cannot
afford the fees. For example, the authentication fees could be assigned on a
sliding scale based on income. Second, China needs to continue looking for
creative ways to increase the number of legal workers, especially public
service lawyers. Current plans to increase the number of lawyers do not cover
the need, and the need is especially great in rural areas.233 Finally, Chinese
courts need to be fair and they need to establish a reputation for fairness.
Extensive and exceedingly complex changes are required for the Tort
Liability Law to actually compensate the people to whom it grants the right of
compensation. The obvious naivety of requesting such colossal changes
parallels the obvious naivety of expecting this law to be effective in a country
that lacks any rudimentary structure for access to justice.
b. Tort Liability Law Created Torts Where Regulations Would Have Been
More Appropriate.
The new Tort Liability Law addresses many harms that instead should have
been regulated by the government because they have such low damages that a
plaintiff would lose money if she sued. The medical ethics provisions of the
tort law make the hospital liable for violating them in tort.234 These include
provisions that make medical institutions liable to patients for the use of
excessive medical testing, insufficient record-keeping, and forgery of hospital
documents in the context of a medical malpractice lawsuit.235 These offenses
have relatively small damages to an individual plaintiff, and it is very unlikely
that people will actually bring a lawsuit against a hospital for violating them.
Because people cannot be expected self-police, this law will be underenforced. It is difficult to imagine that the most desperately poor people in
232
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Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. I, art. 1.
See supra text accompanying notes 130–34.
Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. VII, art. 58, 61, 63.
Id.

KEARNEY GALLEYSPROOFS1

2012]

CHINA’S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM

5/2/2013 9:17 AM

1069

China are going to be able to put up a lawsuit for these types of violations,
especially considering the public mistrust of the judicial system. As written,
these laws will not have much effect on maintaining the quality they strive to
protect, and people who are harmed by them will receive no compensation.
To add insult to injury, most violations of the medical ethics provisions do
not give rise to any tort liability at all. Article 63 forbids “unnecessary
examinations in violation of the procedures and standards for diagnosis and
treatment.”236 Article 61 requires medical institutions to keep copies of medical
history data and to provide it to patients who request their medical records.237
However, neither provision mentions financial liability for the violation. Even
if a hospital violates either of these “rights” and the patient successfully sues,
the patient still may not be compensated. The patient is, therefore, without any
recourse under this law. People will be unlikely to sue for these violations, and
because tort law relies on self-policing through lawsuits, these rules are
unlikely to be enforced.
The current structure for medical ethics violations provides limited
compensation to victims and fails to protect the rights the Tort Liability Law
promises. The medical ethics provisions are the epitome of what is wrong with
the Tort Liability Law. The legislature has put the words on the page and made
promises of new rights, but no party is empowered to enforce those words or
rights and no party can anticipate compensation when those rights are violated.
The medical ethics provisions would be better protected by regulations.238
When self-policing is ineffective, the government’s role is to police to protect
the rights it established.239 Unlike torts, which require private individuals to
enforce rights, regulations are “public in character and modify behavior in an
immediate way through requirements that are imposed before, or at least
independently of, the actual occurrence of harm.”240 Instead, China should
fund a policing agency that regularly checks to ensure hospitals are following
these procedures and fines them when they do not.
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Id. art. 63.
Id. art. 61.
See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 357
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3. To Summarize—The Tort Liability Law Fails to Compensate Victims
The Tort Liability Law fails to fully compensate victims of medical
malpractice. Compensation granted by courts will continue to be
systematically too low. Additionally, most victims of medical malpractice will
not be compensated at all because they will never get into the courtroom.
Because it took seven years for the National People’s Congress to implement
the Tort Liability Law,241 legislative intervention is not a likely solution to
addressing the issues of compensation. Instead, the SPC could influence
compensation by issuing interpretations of the laws that increase
compensation. It could rule that the Tort Liability Law overrules the 2002
Regulation’s compensation scheme and encourage courts to provide more
adequate compensation. Additionally, the judicial system should work toward
increasing access to courts for injured parties. Without these changes, victims
of medical malpractice will be under compensated. The Tort Liability Law will
not “protect the legitimate rights and interests” of medical patients because it
fails to restore victims to their pre-tort condition.242
B. Deterrence—To “prevent . . . tortious conduct”243
The Tort Liability Law specifically recognizes that one of its objectives is
to prevent tortious conduct.244 However, the law will not achieve this objective
because it under deters tortious behavior for several reasons. First, widespread
under-compensation will lead to widespread under-deterrence. Second, the
new law did not allocate liability to physicians, and the physicians are the party
in the best position to increase precaution. This law gives no incentive to
doctors to be more careful,245 so it is unlikely that it will improve the quality of
care or the probability that a physician will commit malpractice. Finally, the
law places all the liability on hospitals,246 which can only control this new cost
by decreasing their activity level. The law incentivizes hospitals to practice
less medicine, which threatens an already insufficient Chinese healthcare
system.247 This Subpart explains how these problems lead to widespread
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Zhang, supra note 177, at 417.
Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. I, art. 1.
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See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See supra Part II.A; see infra Part IV.B.2.
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under-deterrence and presents possible ideal and practical solutions to
managing the flaws in the law as written.
1. The Tort Liability Law Under Deters Because It Under Compensates.
The level of compensation has important effects on the level of deterrence.
For physicians and medical staff to be sufficiently deterred from taking
unreasonable risks, there must be full compensation. As discussed, systematic
under-compensation leads to systematic under-deterrence. The Tort Liability
Law does not provide victims who win a lawsuit with full compensation.
Additionally, because people do not have access to justice and will not get
their cases heard,248 most people will not be compensated at all. Doctors and
hospitals know that, despite the new regulations, the likelihood that they will
ultimately be held accountable for their medical errors is slim. Because
compensation is too low and too infrequent, medical staff does not have the
incentive to take more precaution. It follows that negligent medical practices
will continue at inefficiently high rates.
2. The Tort Liability Law Places Liability on Hospitals Instead of on
Doctors.
Medical accidents are the by-product of a socially valuable activity—the
practice of medicine—that should not be discouraged. Ideally, the law would
put liability on the person who can increase precaution. The Tort Liability Law
places all the liability for medical malpractice on the medical institution.
Articles 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, and 62 place responsibility on the medical facility
and not a single article mentions direct liability for the doctors or any type of
indemnity by which the doctors would ultimately be held liable for their
negligence.249 This Subpart first argues that physicians are in the best position
to increase precaution and should not have been shielded from liability. Then,
the Subpart shows that hospitals are not in the position to increase precaution
and the new law will have the unwanted effect of decreasing the amount of
medical care in China.
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See supra Part IV.A.2.
Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. VII, art. 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 62.
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a. The New Tort Liability Law Did Not Allocate Liability to the Party that
Can Increase Precaution.
The goal of medical malpractice legislation is to encourage doctors to be
more careful.250 To meet this goal, liability for negligence must force doctors
to internalize the externalities caused by their actions such that they have the
appropriate incentive to avoid accidents. For this theory to produce the desired
result, the person causing the externality—here, the doctor—must have the
ability to increase precaution. However, the new law does not incentivize
doctors to take increased precaution because it did not allocate any of the
liability to the doctors.251
The new Tort Liability Law should have placed liability for negligence
directly on healthcare workers instead of on medical facilities. Doctors and
healthcare employees are in a position to internalize the externality of their
carelessness by increasing their own precaution, instead of simply by
decreasing their activity level. If the liability were on doctors, they would be
more likely to take the externalities into account when deciding how much
caution to exercise. Because the costs of not being cautious would increase for
the doctors, they would exercise more caution. Not only would liability on
healthcare professionals increase precaution, but more cautious doctors would
also increase the quality of care.
One reason people riot in hospitals in China is because of a “pervasive
sense of structural overexposure to risk.”252 To address this concern, the new
law sought to prevent tortious conduct.253 When the liability for accidents is
not placed on the party that can increase precaution, the law cannot prevent
tortious conduct, and the people remain over-exposed to risk. Placing liability
on doctors has the potential to increase precaution and prevent many instances
of medical malpractice. By shielding doctors from this liability, Chapter VII
decreases doctors’ incentives to take precautions and increases the likelihood
of accidents. Thus, the misplaced liability threatens to undermine the purposes
of tort law by shielding doctors from liability, decreasing precaution, and
increasing accidents. The people will still be over-exposed to risk.
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See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. VII.
Cooper, supra note 13, at 314.
Tort Liability Law, supra note 21, ch. I, art. 1.
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b. The New Tort Liability Law Incentivizes Hospitals to Lower Their
Activity Level, Which Could Decrease the Supply of Medical Care in
China.
The new Tort Liability Law imposes liability for medical malpractice
entirely on healthcare institutions and none on individual physicians or
healthcare employees.254 Placing the liability on the institutions instead of on
the individual employees could potentially decrease the number of torts by
increasing hospitals’ accountability for quality of care and to incentivize the
hospitals to create and implement standards to prevent medical malpractice. In
other words, the goal of putting liability for medical accidents on hospitals is to
increase precaution at the institutional level.
However, the assumption of the ability of Chinese hospitals to implement
new programs for quality assurance is mislaid. Hospitals are underfunded and
overcrowded, and it would be very difficult for them to invest in the
development of new quality management techniques. More importantly, most
hospital managers do not have the authority to hire or fire physicians because
government authorities decide whether to hire or fire hospital staff.255
Therefore, hospitals have no authority to remove physicians who are negligent.
Without the authority to take action if a policy is violated, hospitals cannot
effectively implement policies to increase precaution.
Tort liability is an added expense to a hospital system that is already
underfunded and insufficient to deal with the recent increase in demand for
services.256 Funds usually diverted to treatment will be diverted to managing
lawsuits based on negligence of physicians that the hospitals cannot control.257
Hit with the liability of medical accidents but virtually unable to increase
precaution among staff, hospitals will have the incentive to—or in many cases,
be forced to—decrease their activity level. This is problematic because as it is,
medical facilities are insufficient.258 Practicing medicine is a socially valuable
activity that tort law should not discourage.
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Id. ch. VII, art. 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 62.
Harris & Wu, supra note 7, at 466.
256 See supra Part II.A.
257 Increasing the price of services is also not an option for Chinese hospitals because the central
government sets prices for services. See Cooper, supra note 13, at 316.
258 See supra Part II.A.
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Additionally, because one of the express goals of the 2002 Regulation was
to improve the general quality of care in hospitals,259 China presumably aspires
to improve the quality of care with the 2010 Tort Liability Law as well.
However, even if the new regulations succeed in decreasing medical
malpractice, this will not trigger any increase in the quality of care. Less
medical care necessarily means less malpractice, but it does not indicate any
improvement in the quality of care that patients receive.
Therefore, the new Tort Liability Law is inefficient because it places
liability for the incidental costs of medicine on a party that cannot increase
precaution and instead must resort to decreasing the activity level of a socially
valuable activity. The misplaced liability could potentially have big
consequences in terms of requiring hospitals to redirect income to defending
themselves in court, and it does nothing to improve the quality of care. Even
the occasionally negligent hospital arguably does more good than harm with its
services, and China is not in a position to be discouraging medical care.
China’s Tort Liability Law should have allocated liability to doctors instead of
hospitals.
c. Potential Solutions for the Misplaced Liability
To address this issue, there must be a mechanism to hold doctors
consistently responsible for their negligence. There are several options for how
to reestablish liability for doctors. New laws could put liability for negligence
on the doctors either directly or by allowing hospitals to seek indemnification
when they are sued due to a doctor’s negligence. The most straightforward way
to pass these laws would be though new legislation from the National People’s
Congress. Alternatively, the SPC could issue rules for indemnification or direct
liability on physicians through its judicial interpretations of the new law.
Because the goal is for the doctors to have some “skin in the game,” another
approach would be to give hospitals more authority in the hiring and firing of
their doctors. Were they able to meaningfully punish doctors for medical
negligence, hospitals could institute quality assurance programs to ensure
physicians take more precautions. Finally, in the event that none of these
changes are implemented, hospitals and other medical institutions could
effectively do the same thing by entering into contracts with doctors that
require indemnification in the event that the hospital is sued for the doctor’s
negligence. Legal practitioners representing hospitals should consider the
259
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possibility of indemnification to safeguard hospitals from medical malpractice
suits.
3. To Summarize—The Tort Liability Law Will Not Sufficiently Deter
Physicians from Being Negligent
The Tort Liability Law will be ineffective in deterring negligent behavior
and will not significantly lower the probability of medical accidents.
Physicians do not expect to fully compensate victims for the physicians’
negligence, so they do not take into account the full social impact of their lack
of care. Additionally, the Tort Liability Law placed no liability directly on the
physicians, so they have no incentive to take precaution to avoid accidents.
Hospitals bear all the burden of malpractice litigation, but they are not in a
position to increase precautions. To avoid lawsuits, they will have to decrease
their activity level despite the fact that China has a shortage of medical
services. The unfortunate consequence of the new law is that it will lead to less
medical care in a country where people desperately need it.
C. Prevention of Self-Help—To “promote the social harmony and stability”260
The third goal of the Tort Liability Law is to prevent retributive hospital
violence.261 Article 64 of the Tort Liability Law directly prohibits interrupting
“the order of the medical system” and promises that disrupters will be “subject
to legal liability.”262 It is unclear to what kind of legal liability this provision
refers. Presumably, because the phrase appears in the Tort Liability Law that is
supposed to form the basis of China’s new civil law code, this provisions is tort
liability. However, tort liability is unlikely to have any effect on retributive
violence in hospitals. Attacking doctors and rioting in hospitals already
constitute criminal offenses in China, and people are frequently arrested for
violating the peace in hospitals.263
Because it is unclear what type of liability this section seeks to impose and
because this section seeks to regulate behavior that occurs despite punishment
in the criminal system, it is unlikely that Article 64 will have any effect on
retributive hospital violence. It does not seek to actually control hospital
violence, but instead seeks to appease the medical community that argued
260
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patients’ and hospitals’ rights needed to be more balanced in the new Tort
Liability Law.264 It may have been successful in appeasing these doctors, but it
will not be successful in curbing hospital violence.
Although the direct prohibition of attacking hospitals will not be effective,
theoretically, the Tort Liability Law could still serve to prevent retributive
violence if it provided a viable alternative for accomplishing justice through
the court system.265 However, the new law will not be successful because the
people will not be convinced that it provides a legitimate method for seeking
justice for several reasons. First, plaintiffs who successfully sue for medical
malpractice receive compensation that is too low and does not restore them to
their pre-tort condition.266 Second, significant barriers to lawsuits discourage or
bar victims from filing suit.267 Potential plaintiffs are unlikely to be able to
afford the authentication fees and do not have access to a lawyer.268
Additionally, the law has done nothing to ensure access to a fair trial, and
Chinese citizens remain untrusting of litigation in general.269 In total, the Tort
Liability Law has not done enough to establish a legitimate legal process for
hearing medical malpractice disputes or to ensure that people have access to
those hearings.
The lofty promises270 that the law created new rights and liberties may have
a temporary effect of pacifying the hospital riots. However, the government
has only placed a Band-Aid on a much deeper and more pervasive problem. It
is a matter of time before the citizenry realizes that the Tort Liability Law is
ineffective, that they have been given empty promises, and that they have
gained no meaningful new civil liberties. Hospital violence is a symptom of the
fundamental problems in the Chinese legal system. Because the Chinese
government has not addressed the greater systemic problems before adopting
tort law, the Tort Liability Law will not eliminate the symptom of hospital
violence.
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CONCLUSION
China’s new law is unlikely to cause any substantial decrease in the level of
malpractice in the country. The Tort Liability Law is an inefficient model, the
burden of which will be borne by underfunded hospitals and patients who are
already underserved. Though tort systems can theoretically decrease medical
malpractice and prevent tort victims from taking vengeance into their own
hands, the objectives of tort law cannot be achieved when the public does not
have access to or trust the court system. Because it lacks the foundation of a
fair trial, China will not be able to deter medical negligence or hospital
violence with the new system.
This Comment made several recommendations for improving the
effectiveness of the Tort Liability Law. For example, the SPC should interpret
the Tort Liability Law as overruling the compensation scheme of the 2002
Regulation and encourage courts to provide full compensation to victims.
Additionally, because liability for malpractice now falls solely on medical
institutions that cannot increase precautions, there needs to be some method to
encourage physicians to do so. This could come through new legislation, SPC
interpretations that allow for indemnification of hospitals by negligent
physicians, increased hospital control over physician hiring and firing, or
indemnification contracts between hospitals and physicians. Ultimately,
though, the Tort Liability Law, like any law that seeks to grant rights that
people demand, cannot be effective in isolation. To be effective, the Tort
Liability Law must exist within a framework in which human rights are valued
and people have reliable, fair access to justice when those rights are violated.
China has a long way to go before it can legitimately make the claim that it
possesses the necessary structure to protect its citizens’ rights.
China has spent many decades ignoring its people in favor of economic
development.271 A by-product of the economic development is that Chinese
citizens are introduced to ideas from outside China and start demanding more
rights. China is starting to grant those rights in name despite the fact that they
do not translate into rights in form. The Tort Liability Law is one example of
this phenomenon. The Tort Liability Law is a step toward a safer and more just
society because it shows that the government is at least cognizant of the
271 See WORLD BANK, China Overview, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview (noting
China’s shift in policy from a focus on economic growth to “a ‘people centered’ strategy aiming to achieve a
‘harmonious society’ that balances economic growth with distributional and ecological concerns.”) (last visited
Oct. 12, 2012).
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people’s demand for more rights. Nonetheless, the program’s successes will be
limited by the insufficiency of justice from its court system and the people’s
resistance to litigation. There will be no widely successful medical malpractice
reform in China until the government becomes willing to provide forums and
opportunities for people to actually experience the benefits of the rights the
legislations promise.
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